NEWSWEEK: Why would a mixed group of Sunni and Shia want to assassinate Ayatollah al-Sistani and seize Najaf?
Vali Nasr: I am not convinced that this group was acting by itself, judging by the kind of military capability that it displayed, and the mission that it had. Killing Imam al-Sistani by exploding a bomb in the shrine by a Shia millenarian group would have totally shattered the unity of the Shia, and particularly would have destroyed the link that keeps the Shia community together. The kind of military capabilities that these fighters brought, to shoot down the U.S helicopter, to be able to hold down U.S. forces for hours on end, is not something that a group of 200 poor thugs following a cultic leader would be capable of.
Do you think Iran had any involvement in the battle?
The Soldiers of Heaven have been ferociously anti-Iranian. The Iranians have no interest in the collapse of Shia authority in Iraq. Whatever problems Iran may have with the United States, strategically for Iran it is not beneficial if Shia authority in Iraq were to collapse. The whole Baathist game plan of coming back to Iraq is predicated on creating chaos in Iraq.
The Soldiers of Heaven are reportedly a mix of both Shia and Sunni Muslims. Isn’t this cooperation unusual?
Yes, and that’s exactly what raises the issue about the role of the insurgents in this. It is possible that this fellow who was running the cult created his own movement that somehow crosses the boundaries of Shia and Sunnis. But in reality, the Sunnis don’t believe in the messiah the way the Shias, the Jews [and] the Christians do. For them, the Mahdi is not a particular person. It is a renewer of the faith, somebody who is a descendent of the prophet, but there is no Day of Judgment or Armageddon. It is very unlikely that Sunnis would follow a claimant to Shia messianity unless they converted to this cult. More than likely what we saw was an insurgent push using the cover of this cult to make an attack on Najaf with the aim of shattering the fabric of Shia politics and authority in Iraq.
According to some traditions, before the coming of the Mahdi, a third of the world will die in a war. Could that encourage a leader like Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to try to hasten World War III?
These prophecies are there, but there is nothing that says humans ought to create these conditions. Such calamities are signs of the times, but they are not a prerequisite for the coming of the Mahdi. Religious tradition does not support that you could bring about the [coming of the] Messiah by doing acts that are actually the domain of God … It is not as straight a line as it is sometimes depicted.
Ahmadinejad has said that there are things ordinary people can do to bring about the Final Days.
This exactly what [Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini said. When he created the revolution in Iran, many traditional Shia leaders criticized him by saying, “Improving the lot of the world is the job of the Hidden Imam [the Mahdi]. There can be no perfect Islamic government in the absence of the Hidden Imam.” Khomeini’s way of going around criticism was to say, “We’re not creating the government of the Hidden Imam, but this government—in its exemplary existence—can perhaps be a precursor for his second coming.” This whole idea was a reaction to the criticism he was receiving from traditionalists.
Do you think Ahmadinejad uses the Mahdi imagery to manipulate popular opinion in Iran?
The way the Iranian leadership looks at the problems of Iraq, Palestine, Hizbullah, its relations with the U.S. and the nuclear issue, is much more secular, political and militaristic. Much like every government, if they have to market war to a population, and justify a foreign policy that includes war, they will use religious themes, including messianic ones, in order to legitimize political action. We have to make a distinction between what makes political leaders tick and separate that from the way in which they market their own political decisions to their own population. When you want to market a war, you have to use scenes that the average citizen would react to, but that should be separated from the kind of thing that goes into the decision making itself … In Iran’s own marketing of its nuclear weapons, religion is distinctly absent from the discussion. It’s all about nationalism: Iran’s rightful place in the world, pride in Iran’s ability to master technology, Iran’s rights. You don’t hear, even from clerics, any sort of language that gives the nuclear technology any sort of religious significance. That’s exactly why the Iranian people have reacted so positively to this nuclear program, because it’s put in secular, nationalist terms.
President George W. Bush has often claimed to be guided in his decisions by his relationship with God. Could this encourage fringe groups like the Soldiers of Heaven to take up arms under the larger banner of the “war of civilizations”?
I think the rhetoric of Washington tends to encourage—not just with the Middle East, but across the Muslim world—this notion that this is more of a culture war rather than a political war. That is exactly why the war on terror has been repeatedly interpreted—from Indonesia to Nigeria—as a war on Islam, and we are not able to shake this thing off.
Given that these fringe groups are being used in a strategic way by the insurgency, what are some of the things we need to be concerned with, going forward?
What happened in Najaf with this group can be a window into the future or Iraq. If [Shiite leader] Moqtada al-Sadr is taken out and the U.S. ends up in a war with Shia militias and radicalizes them and breaks them up into smaller pieces, we’re going to end up with 200 different “Armies of Heaven.” If the Iraqi government is not able to establish authority, and the large militias lose control and break up—that’s exactly what the insurgency wants. The Sunnis cannot defeat the Shia at election or defeat them if the Shia remain united behind their leadership.
Given that Washington plans to send in 20,000 more troops, what do you think the United States can do to avoid a further escalation of sectarian violence?
The Shia militias are not at war with the United States. They are a big problem for Iraq, but they are not at war with the United States. It would be much easier to deal with the Shia militias after we are able to first deal with the [Sunni] insurgency. The policy of going after both of these groups has the danger of sinking Iraq into far bigger chaos. If the insurgent capability is not challenged, and they are able to break down even the little bit of harmony that exists in southern Iraq, the collapse of authority in southern Iraq can be devastating for the U.S. and for Iraq. I don’t believe it is in the U.S.’s benefit at this time to provoke a war with the Shia insurgents.
